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Abstract 
Probability of Default (PD) is a financial term describing the likelihood of default over a particular time horizon. This 
concept has attracted a lot of interest ever since the late 1960‟s and has been extended to the banking sector to predict 
probability of failure as well as bank performance ratings. We derive the probability of bankruptcy and bank ratings in a 
Zimbabwean context based on data between 2009 and 2013, inclusive. 
We build a model to predict the probability of bank failure twelve months in advance for Zimbabwean banks based on 
twelve micro factors. Further, we build the corresponding rating model. The empirical analysis revealed that the 
warning signal so developed produced a robust result with a high prediction accuracy of 92.31% compared to 60% of 
the Altman‟s Z Score model.  
Keywords: Bankruptcy, early warning systems, bank failure. 
JEL Classifications: C19, C22, C32, E43, E44, G10, F59 
1. Introduction 
Zimbabwe has experienced a significant number of bank failures in recent years, some of which could have been 
avoided. Early detection of bank failure is a matter of concern to bank regulators worldwide as it is probably the best 
way to minimise and avoid systemic risk by taking prompt corrective action before the propagation of the problem. 
Given the recent episodes of banking crises, bank failure prediction has rekindled the interest in the adoption of suitable 
early warning systems in bank supervision and regulation. Bank failures continue to occur despite tightening regulations 
imposed by regulators worldwide. This study sought to explore the development and adoption of an early warning 
system which can estimate bank rating and probability of failure twelve months in advance for Zimbabwean banks.  
As at end of 2013, the Zimbabwean banking sector comprised of twenty one banking institutions, one savings bank and 
four building societies. The table below shows the negative growth trends of total banking institutions in the country 
which declined by 38.10% over the ten year period. 
Table 1.1 Architecture of Zimbabwean Banking Sector 2004 – 2013 
 
Dec-04 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 
Banking Institutions 23 21 21 20 23 22 21 
Finance House 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Discount House 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 
Building Society 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Savings 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 42 29 27 25 28 27 26 
Source: Compilation from Monetary Policy Statements, 2004 – 2013 
The negative trend has remained an issue to the Monetary Authorities and the government at large as the sector 
continues to be dogged by a number of weak banks, with high credit risks, deteriorating asset quality and high 
non-performing loans (Monetary Policy June 2013). The vulnerabilities in the sector have eroded customer confidence, 
particularly in smaller banks, resulting in a flow of deposits to bigger banks, which are perceived to be stable resulting 
in the top five banks controlling a combined 65% market share of market deposits (Monetary Policy January 2014). The 
Monetary Authorities have responded to the bank failures by calling for the consolidation of the banking sector and the 
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strengthening of governance in the sector as some of the solutions. 
The IMF Article IV Consultation Report released in June 2014 also highlighted that the financial sector vulnerabilities 
continue to persist, stemming from the high levels of non-performing loans (16.6% on average for banks in March 
2014), low capitalization and low liquidity with wide differentiation across banks. To enhance stability, it was noted that 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) had taken steps to enhance the legal and regulatory framework. In January 2014, 
banks were instructed to immediately end new insider lending and their Boards are now required to ensure adequate 
provisioning and submit regular reports. In addition, the deadline for meeting the minimum capital requirement of 
US$100 million was extended to December 2020 though recapitalization plans which were due by end of June 2014, 
with interim milestones to ensure compliance.  
Though the regulator is putting in measures to stabilise the banking sector, this is a reactionary strategy. Hence, against 
this background, there is need for the Central Bank to adopt new strategies on the regulation and supervision of banks 
given the highly fragile operating environment. 
2. Impact Of Bank Failures 
Empirical evidence shows that bank failures are usually a cost burden to the economy as noted in an International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) study that found that fiscal costs associated with bank failures can range from 3 percent of GDP 
as experienced in the United States to as high as 50 percent of GDP as experienced in Chile and Indonesia (IMF, 2003). 
After the financial regulation in 2000, Kenya suffered thirty nine bank failures which cost 10% of its GDP in terms of 
loans and grants for restructuring, compensating depositors and outright losses due to depositor funds not covered by 
the Deposit Protection Fund compensation scheme (Mamo 2011). In July 2014, the South African Reserve Bank had to 
save the collapsed African Bank (ABIL) by placing it under curatorship and injecting USD 1 billion. 
Elegbe (2013) examined the effect of bank failure on Nigerian economic development using data from 2001 to 2010 
and found that a percentage increase in non-performing loans hampered GDP by 1.57% while an increase in interest 
rate reduced the economy by 8.48%. Industrial production shrinked by 0.15% due to a 1% increase in non-performing 
loans and bank failures had a contagious effect on industrial output reducing it by 0.29% invariably undermining 
consistent economic development. 
It therefore becomes imperative for a country's authorities to safeguard the banking system. Accomplishing this goal 
requires providing banks with a sound macroeconomic environment, supervising and regulating effectively to ensure 
good corporate governance and prudent risk management (Enoch and Green, 1997).  
2.1 Definition of Bank Failure 
Most of the literature on banking distress defines bank failure when the financial institution either received external 
support or was directly closed. Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996) defined a bank failure as when a: 
 Financial institution was recapitalized by either the Central Bank (liquidity injection) or by a strategic investor, 
 Financial institution was acquired by another financial institution, 
 Financial institution surrendered its banking license, 
 Financial institution‟s operations or license was temporarily suspended by the regulatory authority or 
 Regulatory authority closed the financial institution. 
This categorization is intended as a broader concept of bank fragility rather than the more restrictive de jure failure (i.e. 
shut down). For the purposes of this research, bank failure encompasses any of the above mentioned conditions. 
2.2 Data Sources and Characteristics 
It is clear that if a failure prediction model is eventually to be used in a predictive context, the samples of failing and 
non-failing firms used for estimation of the model should be representative of the whole population of firms (Ooghe & 
Joos, 1995). In order to limit bias of selection and also given the relatively small number of banking institutions and the 
failed banks in Zimbabwe, we focused on all banks, both failed and non-failed between 2009 and 2013. The data was 
extracted from the Central Bank database for the period 2009 - 2013. Annual reports were also obtained from respective 
banks‟ websites for the period under study and used as secondary data sources. For the failed banks, 
one-year-prior-to-failure data was extracted except for Genesis Bank where financial data for 2009 could not be 
obtained.  
3. The Modelling Approach 
Various approaches have been used by researchers for modelling default frequencies which include the Bayesian 
method, ANN model, probit model and logit model though logistic regression has been used considerably a lot in bank 
failure prediction. Studies on banking crises/fragility prediction have extensively used the probit/logit framework 
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(Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine), hence we follow a similar approach. 
Selection and Justification of Independent Variables  
The following table describes the independent variables used in the model, how they are deduced for the purposes of the 
model as well as the a priori signs. 
Table 1.2 Independent Variables Used & Explanations 
Variable Explanation Calculation A priori Sign 
LN_Afr Log of Shareholders Funds Shareholder`s Funds On Balance Sheet      - 
Non_Perf_Loans Non Performing Loans Ratio Total Substandard, Doubtful & Loss Loans 
/Total Exposures 
     
     + 
Insider Loans Insider Loans Ratio Insider & Related Exposures/Total Exposures      + 
Mgt_Av_Exp Average Experience of Executive 
Directors 
Executive Directors Total Banking 
Experience/Number of Executive Directors 
     - 
ROE Return On Equity Net Profit After Tax/Shareholder`s Funds       - 
WACOF Weighted Average Cost Of Funds Total Interest Expense/Average Deposit Size       + 
Prud_Liq_Ratio Prudential Liquidity Ratio Liquid Assets/Short Term Liabilities       - 
Bank_Size Average Deposit Market Share Bank Size Of Deposits/Market Deposits       - 
Larg_Shareholder Largest Shareholder Shareholding Largest Shareholding/Total Shares       + 
Bank_Age Years Bank in Existence Date of Publication less Date the Bank was 
incorporated in Zimbabwe 
     - 
Board_Att 
 
Main Board Meetings Attendance Ratio Sum Of Attendance For All Board Members / 
Number of Meetings Held In A Year 
    - 
Founder_Director If Founder Is Still Active In The 
Management Of The Bank 
If Founder is active in Bank =1 and 0 otherwise    +/- 
 
Given the variable explanation above, the logit model then takes the form 
Z = β0 + β1LN_Afr + β2 Non_Perf_Loans + β3 Insider_Loans + β4 Mgt_Av_Exp + β5 ROE + β6 WACOF + β7 
Prud_Liq_Ratio + β8 Bank_Size + β9 Larg_Shareholder + β10 Bank_Age + β11 Board_Att + β12Active_Founder  
The study was focused on micro bank failure prediction and therefore the model excluded macroeconomic variables 
because all banks were assumed to face similar conditions and the main idea was to understand the connection between 
bank stability (or instability) and financial ratios based on the bank balance sheet. 
The selection of variables was mainly motivated by several articles which were published in the local media over the 
past two years as well as the RBZ explanations on the causes of the banking challenges being experienced in the 
country. In her maiden Monetary Policy Statement (January 2014), Dr Charity Dhliwayo blamed insider lending, 
non-performing loans, under capitalization as well as poor corporate governance practices as the panacea to the banking 
challenges. Lance Mambondiani, in an article titled “Is RBZ Doing Enough?” in The Newsday of 02 August 2012 
argued that the Central Bank has to achieve equilibrium while focusing on the core of the problem - ownership 
concentration, connected lending and addressing the problem with non-performing loans. He postulated that the major 
problem with the Zimbabwean banking crisis has been insider ownership concentration which has resulted in corporate 
governance weaknesses in private indigenous banks such as insider lending, abuse of depositors‟ funds and speculative 
activities. 
These postulations motivated the selection of these variables to assess if they do actually impact on bank fragility. We 
also chose variables which are not commonly used so as to avoid window dressing of financials by some banks to avoid 
bias. For example, banks such as AfrAsia and Agribank at one time had capital adequacy ratios of 13.4% and 15.11% 
but were inadequately capitalised in terms of regulatory capital at USD8.71 million and USD12.57 million respectively. 
If the model is built using the traditional capital adequacy ratio, this will result in some bias since banks in Zimbabwe 
generally do not have models that feed into the proper calculation of risk-weighted assets.  
Next we look into the possible influence of each independent variable. 
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3.1 Available Financial Resources (Shareholder`s Funds)        
The capital base of a bank is vital for the protection of its depositors and hence for the maintenance of general 
confidence in its operations and the under-pinning of its long-term stability and growth. Goodhart et al. (1998) 
concluded that as a bank‟s capital decreases, the higher the motivation for actions towards survival. Therefore, the risk 
of failure rises with the decline of capital. A priori, capitalisation and bank failure are negatively correlated. 
3.1.1 Non-Performing Loans Ratio      
Dermirgue-Kunt (1989), Barr and Siems (1994) found out that asset quality is a statistically significant predictor of 
insolvency and that failing banking institutions always have high levels of non-performing loans prior to failure. A 
priori, a positive relationship with probability of failure is expected.  
3.1.2 Insider Loans Ratio 
In her Monetary Policy Statement for January 2014, the then RBZ Acting Governor lamented the impact insider loans 
had caused on the banks and subsequently banned new disbursements of insider loans as these were blamed to be 
driving non-performing loans. Insider loans are a result of affiliated parties getting unjustified loans from commercial 
banks. Insider and related party funding is associated with poor corporate governance structures which result in them 
being weakly monitored, creating a room for diversion of funds from the intended purpose and weakens the capital 
position of the bank given that these are deducted from capital. A positive relationship between insider loans and 
probability of bank failure is anticipated. 
3.1.3 Executive Directors Average Working Experience in Years 
This variable was used as a proxy for management quality which is difficult to measure objectively based on financial 
statement data. Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu (1997) found that deficient bank management and controls (in conjunction 
with other factors) is capable of causing bank failures. A related study “An Evaluation of the Factors Contributing to the 
Failure of National Banks in US - 2011” indicated how important the CEO is by showing that sixty-three percent of the 
failed banks had CEOs that clearly lacked the capability, experience or integrity necessary to make their banks 
successful. We used average working experience for the executive directors as a measure of management quality to 
assess the impact on probability of failure of a bank since bank decision making rests with the Executive Committee 
(EXCO) comprised of the executive directors. A negative relationship was expected, i.e., as average experience 
increases, probability of failure reduces. 
3.1.4 Return on Equity (RoE) 
Profits allow companies to implement their investment strategies and grow. Unsurprisingly, past studies have found 
profitability to be negatively related to the probability of failure (e.g. Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Lanine and Vander 
Vennet, 2006). The profitability of the bank should be considered the driving factor for both the liquidity and solidity 
aspects. In the long run, a bank must generate a sufficient margin on its operations for it to be able to service its debt. 
Return on equity is a measure of the returns on shareholder funds, hence quantifies a bank‟s efficiency in generating 
profits from every unit of shareholder funds. A high ratio implies high profitability and is therefore expected to exhibit a 
negative relationship with the probability of failure. 
3.1.5 Prudential Liquidity Ratio 
Although most bank failures are caused by insolvency, serious liquidity problems can cause an otherwise solvent bank 
to fail under certain conditions (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In the determination of liquidity risk, it is vital to not only 
focus on current sources of liquidity and funding needs, but also to focus on future sources of liquidity and future 
funding needs. Consequently, in order to operate in a sound manner, banks need to maintain a level of liquidity 
sufficient to meet current as well as future financial obligations. This implies that a bank should be able to manage 
unanticipated changes in funding sources and to manage unanticipated market conditions that directly affect the 
liquidity of assets. Hence, liquidity risk is based on current liquidity, future liquidity and the ability to ensure that 
liquidity can be maintained. Liquidity ratio measures a bank‟s ability to withstand a possible deposit run-off. It 
measures what percentage of customer funds and short-term funds could be met if they were withdrawn unexpectedly. 
The liquidity position of the banking system is very relevant for the study sample given that the market is currently 
characterized by a high turnover of deposits and limited alternative sources of funding (IMF, 2012b).  The higher this 
ratio is, the higher the liquidity. The relation between this ratio and the probability of failure is expected to be negative.  
3.1.6 Bank Size 
Besides non-accounting and qualitative variables, general characteristics concerning the bank size have proven to be 
very important variables in failure prediction. On one hand, the literature on the relationship between bank size and 
stability has found ambiguous results for banks in the U.S (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Calomiris and Mason, 2000; Chung, 
2004; Hughes and Mester, 1998, among others). De Nicolo (2000), on the other hand, found a positive and significant 
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relationship between bank size and the probability of failure for banks in the U.S., Japan and several European countries. 
Apart from the intrinsic relationship between bank size and stability, larger banks might also be less likely to fail as they 
are considered to be too important to fail (e.g. Mishkin, 1999).  
3.1.7 Shareholder Structure 
One of the several regulatory responses to the financial crisis has been to consider the extent to which bank failure can 
be explained by flaws in the banks‟ corporate governance arrangements (Kirkpatrick, 2009). In Zimbabwe, the Banking 
Act and the proposed amendments to the Act stipulate that neither an individual nor company must hold more than 5% 
and 25% shareholding respectively in order to manage influence of largest and dominant shareholders. Brownbridge 
(1998) noted that insider lending was the excessive concentration of ownership. He found that in many of the failed 
banks in Africa, the majority of shares were held by one man or one family, while managers lacked sufficient 
independence from interference by owners in operational decisions. A more diversified ownership structure and a more 
independent management are expected to impose greater constraints on insider lending, because at least some of the 
directors would stand to lose more than they gain from insider lending, while managers would not want to risk their 
reputations and careers. 
3.1.8 Bank Age    
DeYoung (1999) found that bank age influences the risk of failure. Empirical evidence has shown that newly-founded 
banks are more likely to fail than older banks (Bickerdyke et al., 2000; Thornhill & Amit, 2002). Given this background, 
we wanted to establish the relationship between bank age and failure probability in a Zimbabwean context given also 
that the banks which have failed so far were relatively new banks. A negative relationship is expected. 
3.1.9 Board Meetings Attendance  
According to the Central Bank`s Corporate Governance Guideline (CGG) 01/2004, every member of the board is 
expected to attend at least 75% of the board meetings of a banking institution to ensure that they discharge their duties 
and responsibilities effectively. Board meetings are also a statutory requirement as these are disclosed in the annual 
reports. A negative relationship between board attendance and bank failure is expected. 
3.1.10 Founder-Director Role 
Theory predicts that banks with large dominating shareholders – with easy control over management – tend to take 
more aggressive risks than manager-dominated banks with small disperse shareholdings, as diversified owners have 
stronger incentives to take aggressive risks than non-shareholding managers with bank-specific human capital and 
private control benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Galai and Masulis, 1976).  
It was important to include this variable in the model in order to determine the exact relationship between bank failure 
and conflict of interest. A negative relationship is expected. 
3.1.11 Cost of Funds 
Higher deposit rates may act as an early warning signal of bank failure, a feature that has already been noticed in the 
empirical finance literature (e.g. Ellis and Flannery, 1992; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995). Moral hazard on bank owners 
can be exacerbated by a number of factors. First, an increase in the interest rate may lead borrowers to choose 
investments with higher returns when successful but with lower probabilities of success (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981): 
hence, a rise in deposit rates could induce banks to adopt more risky investment strategies. A rise in bank lending rates 
can have similar incentive effects on the bank's borrowers. Thus, a positive relationship is expected between cost of 
funds and probability of failure. 
3.1.12 Error term 
The error term is important since it captures the influence of all independent or exogenous variables that are excluded 
from the model such as level of education of directors, number of board meetings and frequency, number of branches, 
etc. It also represents other factors that can influence the probability of default of a bank but not captured in the model. 
The error term is assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and constant variance (Gujarati, 2004). 
3.1.13 Constant 
According to Gujarati (2004), there is no real meaning derived from the constant but it is essential in the model because 
it shows autonomous default. This is something that is always there in the market even before the bank starts operating, 
there is failure risk.  
4. Diagnostic Tests 
A series of diagnostic tests were performed in order to test for econometrics a priori postulations, that is, to find whether 
the data collected and used abide to such requirements or not.  
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4.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is the correlation between explanatory variables used in a regression model (Maddala, 2010). 
According to Gujarati (2004), any explanatory variables used for regression purpose must not be highly collinearly 
related, that is, their collinearity must not exceed 80%. A correlation matrix of explanatory variables was used to test 
whether multicollinearity was present or not. The null hypothesis tested was that the model suffered from 
multicollinearity against the alterative that is, the model was free from multicollinearity.  
4.2 Variable Significance & Worthiness Tests 
Significance tests were used to determine whether a particular variable was making a useful contribution to the model. 
We employed the one tailed t-test at 95% confidence interval using 24 degrees of freedom to ascertain the usefulness of 
the twelve variables to the overall model and 10% probability for the worthiness tests. The decision rules of accepting 
the significance of a variable are where t-stat > t-calc for variable significance tests and t-calc > t-stat for worthiness 
tests. 
4.2.1 Robustness Checks 
We ran robustness checks by comparing predictive power of the model against a classical Altman Z Score Model which 
has a prediction accuracy rate of 95%. This was to ensure results were consistent with classical models and variances 
were investigated and explained. 
4.2.2 Goodness of Fit Measure 
Goodness of fit measure is the Pseudo R
2
 as proposed by McFadden in 1974.The goodness of fit would be close to 0 if 
the regression has no explanatory power, and if very good, would be close to 1. Otherwise, R
2 
of 0.2 – 0.4 is for a good 
model, according to McFadden. 
4.2.3 Accuracy Rate  
A classification matrix which is a matrix containing numbers that reveal the predictive ability of the model was used. 
The overall accuracy rate is the percentage of correct classification to total classifications. This overall accuracy rate 
can be separated into the accuracy rate of good predicted bankrupt firms and good predicted non-bankrupt firms. 
5. Data Analysis and Presentation 
5.1 Multicollinearity Test 
The hypothesis was stated as follows: 
H0: model suffers from multicollinearity. 
H1: model is free from multicollinearity. 
Table 2.1 Multicollinearity Test Results 
 
LN_Afr 
Non_Perf
_Loans 
Insider_
Loans 
Mgt_Av
_ Exp ROE WACOF 
Prud_Li
q_Ratio 
Dep_
Size 
Larg_ 
Shareho
lder 
Bank_
Age 
Board
_Att 
Active_
Founder 
LN_Afr 1.000   
        
    
Non_Perf_Loans -0.413 1.000 
        
    
Insider_Loans -0.614 0.253 1.000 
       
    
Mgt_Av_ Exp 0.435 -0.322 -0.349 1.000 
      
    
ROE 0.493 -0.491 -0.042 0.304 1.000 
     
    
WACOF -0.288 0.183 0.326 -0.023 -0.251 1.000 
    
    
Prud_Liq_Ratio 0.529 -0.526 -0.563 0.230 0.258 -0.464 1.000 
   
    
Bank_Size 0.656 -0.367 -0.286 0.341 0.449 -0.032 0.164 1.000 
  
    
Larg_ Shareholder -0.399 -0.041 0.286 -0.229 -0.178 -0.024 0.233 -0.452 1.000 
 
    
Bank_Age 0.282 -0.223 -0.564 0.150 0.081 -0.402 0.383 0.150 -0.060 1.000     
Board_Att 0.240 0.034 -0.094 0.172 -0.045 0.165 0.347 -0.046 0.180 0.076 1.000   
Active_Founder -0.601 -0.031 0.569 -0.290 -0.366 0.498 -0.488 -0.268 0.238 -0.340 -0.131 1.000 
 
The results from Table 2.1 above show that there is no collinearity among the variables as correlations ranged between 
0.023 and 0.656. Therefore, it means that these explanatory variables are independent of one another, hence we reject 
the null hypothesis that the model suffers from multi-collinearity. After running the model at 95% confidence level, the 
below tabulated results were obtained. 
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Table 2.2 Logit Regression Results 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 35.5268 52.0245 0.6829 0.5076 -77.8248 148.8785 
LN_Afr -2.0024 3.0791 -0.6503 0.04277 -8.7111 4.7063 
Non_Perf_Loans 31.4907 25.5708 1.23151 0.0066 -2.4351 65.4164 
Insider_Loans 56.084 67.0956 0.8359 0.004196 -90.1047 202.2727 
Mgt_Av_ Exp -0.1803 0.2609 -0.691 0.065027 -0.3881 0.7487 
ROE -3.1101 9.3373 -0.3331 0.07448 -23.4542 17.2341 
WACOF 42.4612 46.541 0.9123 0.003796 -58.943 143.8653 
Prud_Liq_Ratio -1.7506 13.8069 -0.1268 0.009012 -31.8331 28.332 
Bank_Size -1.111 31.2353 -0.0356 0.09722 -69.167 66.9449 
Larg_ Shareholder 7.8708 5.7753 1.3629 0.0198 -4.7124 20.4541 
Bank_Age -0.0232 0.0419 -0.5542 0.05896 -0.1146 0.0681 
Board_Att -23.0634 12.7152 -1.8138 0.0948 -50.7675 4.6407 
Active_Founder 3.0229 5.6398 0.536 0.06018 -9.2652 15.311 
Given the above results, the resultant multiple regression model was deduced to be:  
Z = 35.5268 - 2.0024 LN_Afr + 31.4907 Non_Perf_Loans + 56.0840 Insider Loans - 0.1803 Mgt_Av_Exp - 3.1101 
ROE + 42.4612 WACOF - 1.7506 Prud_Liq_Ratio - 1.1110 Bank_Size + 7.8708 Larg_Shareholder - 0.0232 Bank_Age 
- 23.0634 Board_Att + 3.0229 Founder_Director 
Table 2.3 Regression Results 
Regression Statistics 
 Multiple R 0.920396 
R Square 0.847129 
Adjusted R Square 0.694258 
Standard Error 5.638902 
Observations 25 
 
The model shows that insider loans, non perfoming loans and funding costs are the major drivers of bank Probability of 
Failure (PF) in Zimbabwe as shown by the high coefficients of 56.08, 31.49 and 42.46, respectively. Further, the results 
indicate that, in line with economic theory, the PF is negatively correlated to regulatory capital level, average 
management experience, earnings, liquidity ratio, bank size, main board meetings attendance and bank age. Thus, 
empirical evidence suggests these factors reduce bank failure probability. Banks that are well capitalized in terms of 
regulatory capital and have good earning profiles are less likely to experience distress in the next twelve months.  
Similarly, the PF is positively related to non performing loans ratio, insider loans, weighted average cost of funds, stock 
held by the largest shareholder and involvement of the founder in the management of the bank, thus these increase the 
probability of failure of a bank. 
There is also significant evidence in favor of the market discipline hypothesis. The model shows that depositor 
discipline has an important signaling effect: when a bank pays more on deposits than its competitors, it has a significant 
impact on probability of distress. Those banks that “bargain for resurrection” in difficult times by increasing their 
deposit rates are more likely to experience financial distress in the next year. This finding is in line with some of the 
research on other countries, for example the results of Kraft and Galac (2007). Liquidity does not come out significant 
in the baseline estimation and this could be a result of the model trying to identify distress over a one-year window. 
When a bank‟s problems turn into a liquidity problem, it is often only very shortly (i.e. days) before intervention. Bank 
liquidity varies substantially over time, while the indicator accounts only for the amount of liquid assets banks hold in 
their portfolio as at the last day of financial reporting. Unfortunately, bank balance sheets do not show average liquidity 
over a certain reporting period to assess the average liquidity risk. 
5.2 Variable Significance & Worthiness Tests Results 
We used one tailed t-test at 95% confidence level and 24 degrees of freedom (TINV 95%, 24 df) to determine the 
significance of each variable and obtained the following results: 
Hypothesis 
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H0: B1=1 Reject the hypothesis that the variable is not a significant factor in determining probability of bank failure.  
H1: B1>1 Accept the hypothesis that the variable is a significant factor in determining probability of bank failure. 
Table 2.4 Variable Significance Test Results 
Variable t calc t stat Decision Rule Conclusion 
LN_Afr -0.6503301 0.0633658 
t calc lies outside acceptable region, 
reject H0 Variable is significant 
Non_Perf_Loans 1.2315112 0.0633658 t calc > t stat, reject H0 Variable is significant 
Insider_Loans 0.8358826 0.0633658 t calc > t stat, reject H0 Variable is significant 
Mgt_Av_ Exp 0.6909937 0.0633658 t calc > t stat, reject H0 Variable is significant 
ROE -0.3330813 0.0633658 
t calc lies outside acceptable region, 
reject H0 Variable is significant 
WACOF 0.9123389 0.0633658 t calc > t stat, reject H0 Variable is significant 
Prud_Liq_Ratio -0.1267903 0.0633658 
t calc lies outside acceptable region, 
reject H0 Variable is significant 
Bank_Size -0.0355694 0.0633658 
t calc lies outside acceptable region, 
reject H0 Variable is significant 
Larg_ 
Shareholder 1.3628519 0.0633658 t calc > t stat, reject H0 Variable is significant 
Bank_Age -0.5541753 0.0633658 
t calc lies outside acceptable region, 
reject H0 Variable is significant 
Board_Att -1.8138433 0.0633658 
t calc lies outside acceptable region, 
reject H0 Variable is significant 
Active_Founder 0.5359928 0.0633658 t calc > t stat, reject H0 Variable is significant 
From the results, it can be concluded that all the variables used in the model were significant determinants of 
probability of failure. 
Table 2.5 Variable Worthiness Test Results 
Variable t calc t stat Decision Rule Conclusion 
LN_Afr -0.6503301 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
Non_Perf_Loans 1.2315112 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
Insider_Loans 0.8358826 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
Mgt_Av_ Exp 0.6909937 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
ROE -0.3330813 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
WACOF 0.9123389 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
Prud_Liq_Ratio -0.1267903 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
Bank_Size -0.0355694 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
Larg_ 
Shareholder 1.3628519 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
Bank_Age -0.5541753 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
Board_Att -1.8138433 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
Active_Founder 0.5359928 1.710882 t stat > t calc,reject H0 Variable is Worth 
To test for worthiness, we used one tailed t-tests at 10% probability and 24 degrees of freedom (TINV 10%,24 df) to 
determine the significance of each variable and obtained the under listed results.  
Hypothesis 
H0: B1=1 Reject the hypothesis that the variable is not a worth factor in determining probability of bank failure.  
H1: B1>1 Do not reject the hypothesis that the variable is a worth factor in determining probability of bank failure. 
Thus, all the variables were found to be worth in explaining probability of failure. 
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5.3 Validating The Logit Model To Bank Published Financials 
The model was simulated to the one-year-prior-to-failure for failed banks and 2013 financials for non-failed banks to 
ascertain its relevance and predictive strength. 
The probability of failure (PF) is then given by: 
𝑃𝐹(𝑧) =
𝟏
𝟏 + 𝒆−𝒁
 
where Z is given by: 
Z = 35.5268 - 2.0024 LN_Afr + 31.4907 Non_Perf_Loans + 56.0840 Insider Loans - 0.1803 Mgt_Av_Exp - 3.1101 
ROE + 42.4612 WACOF - 1.7506 Prud_Liq_Ratio - 1.1110 Bank_Size + 7.8708 Larg_Shareholder - 0.0232 Bank_Age 
- 23.0634 Board_Att + 3.0229 Founder_Director  
Table 2.6 Simulation Results 
Institution Model Z Score 
Probability Of 
Failure 
RBZ Sub 
Rating Risk Level S& P Moody's 
Standard Chartered -13.06835755 0.00% 1 Insignificant AAA Aaa 
Barclays -11.19397931 0.00% 2 Insignificant AAA Aaa 
Stanbic -9.8092114 0.01% 3 Insignificant AAA Aaa 
CABS -9.46796495 0.01% 4 Insignificant AAA Aaa 
MBCA -3.99900925 1.80% 5 Insignificant AAA Aaa 
CBZ Bank -3.96551676 1.86% 6 Insignificant AAA Aaa 
BancABC -2.69675312 6.32% 2a Modest AA+ Aa1+ 
ZB -1.98517106 12.08% 2b Modest AA Aa2 
FBC -1.70366315 15.40% 2c Modest AA- Aa3 
NMB -1.50326743 18.19% 3a Average A+ A1 
Ecobank -1.49701811 18.29% 3a Average A+ A1 
POSB -1.47769748 18.58% 3a Average A+ A1 
Steward -0.00000013 50.00% 5a Acceptable With Care BB+ Ba1 
Agribank 3.07403538 95.58% 10 Bankrupt D D 
Metbank 3.66361129 97.50% 10 Bankrupt D D 
Tetrad 3.72887673 97.65% 10 Bankrupt D D 
Capital 4.02438918 98.24% 10 Bankrupt D D 
TN *** 5.92598672 99.73% 10 Bankrupt D D 
Kingdom** 7.34756559 99.94% 10 Bankrupt D D 
Allied 9.1750898 99.99% 10 Bankrupt D D 
Renaissance* 11.24664618 100.00% 10 Bankrupt D D 
Trust 12.10419652 100.00% 10 Bankrupt D D 
Interfin 13.35505411 100.00% 10 Bankrupt D D 
Royal 13.37560499 100.00% 10 Bankrupt D D 
AfrAsia 13.90061474 100.00% 10 Bankrupt D D 
 
The model was back-tested with the data set compiled from 1999 to 2012 and used to predict 2013 position. Based on 
one-year-prior-to-failure financials for failed institutions and 2012 financials for non-failed banks, the following results 
were obtained and ranked according to probability of failure and rating as per RBZ Sub-Rating as well as S&P and 
Moody‟s Ratings. 
The obtained results are in line with the actual obtaining situation in the financial sector in Zimbabwe at the present 
moment. Average PF for the banking sector was simulated to be 53.21% which is consistent with World Bank and IMF 
(2013) ratings of the banking sector which was rated “highly fragile”. Based on publicly available information, 
international banks (Standard Chartered, Stanbic, Barclays, and MBCA) have remained stable given their credit risk 
averse strategies as shown by high liquidity ratios and relatively low loans to deposits ratios of 57% and 62% against 18% 
and 93% ratios of local banks, respectively on average. This is consistent with the model results as foreign stable banks 
were rated “AAA” under the S&P Rating, “Aaa” under the Moody`s and “1” under the RBZ Sub Rating with 
insignificant risk and a failure probability below 1.80% in the period t + 1 year. The banks remained strong in 2013 and 
going into 2014 with most of them offering competition through finer lending rates of as low as 6% to blue chip and 
quality clients which other struggling local banks cannot match given the weighted average funding costs of as high as 
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15%. Because of their stability, the foreign banks have managed to attract low cost deposits whilst limiting the 
relatively wholesale deposits. In addition, foreign banks have been offering competition by offering clients same day 
value for cross border payments because of the stable liquidity positions which local banks, grappling from the liquidity 
challenges, cannot match, thus increasing their vulnerability. 
The model managed to predict the failure of all the collapsed banks with good precision. On the other hand, local banks 
continue to struggle as liquidity challenges engulf the economy with the relatively small and young banks collapsing. 
Amongst the stable local banks are the big banks, CBZ, FBC, CABS, ZB and BancABC whose average life span is 
more than 15 years and these were classified under low failure in the period t + 1. Given the public information at hand, 
the model correctly predicted failure of the institutions rated “extreme” as per the study definition where failure referred 
to either collapse, take over due to challenges, surrendering an operating licence or surveillance by the regulator under 
the Troubled & Insolvent Banks Policy. 
6. Prediction Results 
When testing the performance of a model designed to predict bankruptcy, it is particularly interesting to review its 
ability to identify bankrupt firms as misclassification may result in wrong decisions and incurring unnecessary costs e.g. 
missing a failing bank. This calls for the aspiration to find a model that performs well in identifying both bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt banks and hence fewer errors.  
An important property of the logistic model is its precision in terms of minimizing Type I and Type II errors. A Type I 
error occurs when the model fails to identify the distressed bank and a Type II error occurs when a healthy bank is 
falsely identified as distressed. To attribute a particular bank into one of the two categories (distressed versus healthy), 
one needs to set up a cutoff point in terms of the bank PF. All banks above that cutoff point are blacklisted as weak 
banks while all banks below that point are classified as healthy. A higher cutoff point results in a lower number of banks 
on the blacklist of weak banks, which tends to increase the Type I errors. Setting a lower cutoff point can reduce the 
Type I errors but at the expense of generating more Type II errors. The optimal cutoff point depends on the relative 
weights that an analyst puts on Type I and Type II errors (Petersen, 2006). To address the trade-off between Type I and 
Type II errors, we illustrated the sensitivity of Type I and Type II errors with respect to the choice of the cutoff point of 
50% where PF greater than this was considered failure and vice versa. The table below shows the prediction 
classification generated by the model showing Type I and II errors. 
Table 2.7 Prediction Classification  
 Failed Non Failed 
Predicted Failure Correctly Predicted          92.31% Type II Error                 0.00% 
Predicted Non Failure Type I Error                 7.69% Correct Prediction           100.00% 
Source: Computed Data from Model Results  
The model correctly predicted 92.31% of the failures and mis - classified one bank under non failure whilst in actual 
fact it is under stress, thus the Type II error of 7.69%. It is important to note that there was no Type I error. A situation 
that will be costly to a regulator is missing a stressed bank. 
7. Robustness Comparison  
7.1 Testing Altman’s Z Score Model  
To get a better understanding of its robustness and effectiveness, we tested Altman‟s (1968) model with the current 
sample of the banks using 2012 financials. Keeping the same coefficients and replacing the market value of equity by 
the book value for one of the variables, z-scores were calculated for each bank. The cutoff z-score was set to 0.5, the 
point that best discriminates between the bankrupt and non-bankrupt groups and the results obtained are as set out in the 
table below. 
Table 2.8 Altman‟s Z Score Prediction Classification 
 Failed               Non Failed 
Predicted Failure Correctly Predicted               60.00% Type II Error             40.00% 
Predicted Non Failure Type I Error                      0.00% Correct Prediction        100.00% 
Source: Computed Data from Model Results  
This was done as a test of the applicability and predictive power of Altman‟s Z Score on Zimbabwean banks as well as 
checking and benchmarking the prediction powers of the developed model and the Altman‟s Z Score model. 
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The results show that Altman model correctly predicted 60% of the failures compared to 92.31% prediction by the 
model under study which entails a higher Type 11 error rate of 40% and results in misallocation of resources in terms of 
bank supervision allocating time and resources on safe banks. 
The table below shows the Altman`s Z Score prediction of the sample of the banks under study and their respective 
failure classification. 
Table 2.9 Comparison of Model against Altman`s Z Score Model 
Institution Probability Of Failure Risk Level Altman`s Z Score 
Standard Chartered 0.00% Insignificant Safe Zone 
Barclays 0.00% Insignificant Safe Zone 
Stanbic 0.01% Insignificant Safe Zone 
CABS 0.01% Insignificant Safe Zone 
MBCA 1.80% Insignificant Safe Zone 
CBZ Bank 1.86% Insignificant Grey Zone 
BancABC 6.32% Modest Grey Zone 
ZB 12.08% Modest Grey Zone 
FBC 15.40% Modest Grey Zone 
NMB 18.19% Average Grey Zone 
Ecobank 18.29% Average Grey Zone 
POSB 18.58% Average Distress 
Steward 49.18% Acceptable With Care Distress 
Agribank 95.58% Bankrupt Distress 
Metbank 97.50% Bankrupt Distress 
Tetrad 97.65% Bankrupt Grey Zone 
Capital 98.24% Bankrupt Distress 
TN *** 99.73% Bankrupt Distress 
Kingdom** 99.94% Bankrupt Distress 
Allied 99.99% Bankrupt Distress 
Renaissance* 100.00% Bankrupt Distress 
Trust 100.00% Bankrupt Distress 
Interfin 100.00% Bankrupt Distress 
Royal 100.00% Bankrupt Distress 
AfrAsia 100.00% Bankrupt Distress 
The Altman`s Z Score Model showed that the international banks (Standard Chartered, Barclays, Stanbic, MBCA and 
CABS) were consistent with our Model as they were rated in the “Safe Zone”. Altman‟s Z Score Model wrongly 
classified the stable banks (CBZ, BancABC, FBC, ZB, Ecobank and NMB) into the “Grey Zone. It also mis-classified 
POSB as a “Distressed” bank whilst Tetrad, a failed bank according to the study definition was classified under “Grey 
Zone” instead of “Distress”. However, it correctly predicted 60% of the failures but gave a relatively high Type II error 
of 40% implying the regulator could have spent resources and time focusing on non-stressed banks. The graph below 
compares robustness of the Altman`s Model against our model. 
 
Figure 2.1 Robustness Comparison 
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Possible Explanations for the Low Accuracy Rate of Altman‟s Z Score Model 
The Altman‟s Z Score model may have produced a low accuracy rate due to different economic conditions between 
Zimbabwe and the USA where the model was developed as noted by Grice and Ingram (2001) who pointed out that 
researchers often mistakenly assumed that their models are stable across economic conditions that change over time, 
such as inflation, interest rates, and credit availability. The business environment of the mid-1900s, from which 
Altman‟s model was estimated, is drastically different from today‟s environment, thus the model is outdated and would 
not be accurate in current time. Altman‟s sample consisted of only manufacturing firms and as highlighted by Platt and 
Platt (1991), a model developed using firms from one set of industries may not be highly accurate in predicting 
bankruptcy for firms in other industries. 
The other discrepancy could have emanated from differences in reporting requirements which could have since changed 
materially (Grice and Ingram, 2001) over time. 
7.2 Our Model Against RBZ Offsite CAMELS Ratings 
The researchers obtained offsite CAMELS Ratings done by the Regulator for the period one year to the reporting dates 
to assess the conditions of the banks based on the ratings. Ratings above “4” indicated stress and were used as a cutoff 
of high probability of failure and otherwise for ratings below “4”. 
Table 2.10 CAMELS Ratings 2009 – 2013 
 
Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 
Agribank 3 4 3 4 4 
BancABC 2 1 3 3 3 
Barclays 1 2 2 3 2 
CBZ 2 2 3 2 2 
FBC 2 2 2 2 2 
Interfin 3 3 4 
Under 
Curatorship 
 Kingdom 2 3 3 Taken Over 
 MBCA 3 2 2 2 2 
Metbank 2 2 2 2 4 
NMB 3 2 2 2 3 
Royal 
  
4 4 Closed 
Stanbic 2 1 1 1 1 
Steward 
    
4 
StanChart 2 1 2 2 2 
TN Bank 3 3 3 3 Taken Over 
Trust 
  
4 4 Closed 
ZABG 4 5 5 5 5 
ZB Bank 3 2 2 2 2 
Genesis 4 5 5 Closed 
 Ecobank 3 3 4 3 3 
Renaissance 4 4 
 
Taken Over 
 Tetrad 3 3 3 3 4 
CABS 2 2 2 2 2 
POSB 4 2 2 2 2 
Capital 
  
3 4 4 
AfrAsia   
 
  3 4 
 
The ratings confirm the 12 months in advance predictions done by the developed logit model as all banks that were 
rated above “4” were correctly predicted by the model well in advance. The CAMELS model thus gives a rating ex ante 
which makes it difficult for regulators to effectively and efficiently supervise banks. The main disadvantage then 
becomes an issue of realizing the poor rating of the bank historically resulting in late prescription of remedial actions 
like in the case of Interfin which technically failed under the regulator‟s nose. 
8. Conclusion 
The constructed model can be used as an analytical early warning decision support tool in both on-site and off-site bank 
monitoring system to detect banks that may be experiencing challenges. The ability to detect any problem in bank 
condition from publicly available data will also reduce the cost of monitoring banks by lessening the need for on-site 
examinations, and equally provide very valuable information to the decision makers as well as to other interested parties. 
The early warning signal could also be a veritable decision support tool for individual banks, the results of which will 
provide the basis for proactive measures that can forestall any emerging distress conditions. The model could be used as 
an alternative or supplementary decision support tool to the CAMELS rating system commonly employed by the RBZ 
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in bank examination process. 
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